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Benjamin Strong (1872-1928) was born in 1872 in Fishkill-on- 
Hudson, New York. He started a financial career in 1891 with Cuyler, 
Morgan and Co., an investment and financial management firm. Later 
he became assistant secretary of Atlantic Trust Co., and following several 
mergers, he was named secretary of Bankers Trust Co. in 1904. He 
became vice president in 1909 and president in 1914. Later he served 
as governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 1914-1928. 
Benjamin Strong’s great-grandfather Benjamin was the first of the family 
to become prominent in American finance. He served as Alexander 
Hamilton’s first clerk in the Treasury in 1789-91 and then he became 
a founder and the second president of the Seamen’s Bank for Savings 
after several careers. Strong’s father, Benjamin began his career in 
railroading after graduating from Columbia College in 1854. According 
to Lester V. Chandler, the only biographer of Benjamin Strong, 
Strong “inherited many things from his family; among them were 
high native intelligence, a respect for learning, a sense of belonging 
to a family with a respectable history and social acceptability, and an 
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almost puritanic tradition of social responsibility.”1) 
Financial system of the United States can be characterized as 
lacking a genuine central bank like the Bank of England. There 
existed the First Bank of the United States (1791-1811) and the 
Second Bank of the United States (1816-1836), both of which were 
rather weak institutions from the point of view of the “standard” central 
bank. Since the abolition of the second bank, American economic development 
was attained without a central banking system. The severe financial 
panic of 1907 with runs of many banks, however, made financiers and 
politicians realize the necessity of a sound central banking system in 
the country. The following year, Senator Nelson W. Aldrich established 
and chaired a commission to investigate the crisis and propose future 
solutions, leading to the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 
1913. Benjamin Strong was interested in the banking reform process 
especially after 1911, when he endorsed the defeated Aldrich plan. 
Strong thought the Federal Reserve Bank of New York should play the 
role of the Bank of England, and regarded twelve reserve banks too 
many. He believed the issuing of the Federal Reserve notes was too 
reminiscent of greenbacks and other fiat money.2) Shortly after 
Strong became president of the Bankers Trust Co., he was appointed 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which position he 
maintained until his death in 1928.
As the European war started, exports increased and gold flowed to 
the United States in payment. As the Federal Reserve Act lowered the 
reserve requirement against deposits, considerable amount of excess 
1) Lester V. Chandler, Benjamin Strong Central Banker, (Arno Press, New York, 
1978), 22.
2) Allan H. Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve: Vol. 1: 1913-1951 (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 76.
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reserves accumulated in the banking system. Price levels rose rapidly, 
with wholesale prices increasing about 75 percent by mid-1917. During 
its first two and a half years, however, the Federal Reserve had 
almost no power to control the monetary and credit situation and had 
little opportunity to develop instruments of general monetary policy. 
On the other hand, the Federal Reserve succeeded in cooperating with 
the government in selling four wartime Liberty Loans and a Victory 
Loan. Concerning the war loans’ mechanism, the following argument 
reveals Strong’s viewpoint clearly:
The general theory about Government loans and the injustices 
which they create has been that after war is over high taxes are 
largely applied to the reduction of the debt, meaning that the poorer 
classes, who own no bonds, are taxed to pay interest and principal 
to the richer classes who do. This has all been in our minds in 
connection with these campaigns and we have sought by every means 
in our power, including the patriotic appeal, to reach the poorer and 
wage earner classes, to make them bond holders and better citizens, 
and the collectors of interest and principal rather than simply payers 
of taxes. It has been one of the main principles behind our whole 
program.3)
By the end of the war, the European allied powers owed the United 
States about $12 billion, of which a little under $5 billion was due 
from Britain and $4 billion from France.4) Britain and France tried to 
link reparations to their war debts from the start of Paris Peace 
Conference, indicating that they might be prepared to moderate their 
demands for reparations if the United States would forgive some of 
3) Chandler, 123.
4) Liaquat Ahamed, Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World 
(The Penguin Press, New York, 2009), 130-131.
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what they owed America. The United States would not agree with this 
position. After all, reparations resembled a fine, were intended to be 
punitive, and war debts were contractual liabilities voluntarily entered 
into by the European Allies. The total sum of German reparations was 
fixed at $12 billion at first in 1921, which equals $2.4 trillion in 
today’s value.5)
American bankers and government officials (“elites”) understood 
well that the U.S. loan was necessary for the European recovery and 
without it the U.S. export to Europe would not expand adequately. 
William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate for the Presidential 
election in 1896 said without hesitation that the Federal Reserve 
system was controlled by Wall Street speculators, and that it was 
engaged in draining the agricultural districts to “keep up a fictitious 
prosperity among members of the plunderbund. “It would be better to 
repeal the Federal Reserve Act and “go back to the old conditions” 
than to turn the system “over to Wall Street and allow its tremendous 
power to be used for the carrying out of the plans of the money 
trust.”6) Strong had been staying often for weeks or even months in 
Europe and became aware of the European situation. He wrote from 
London in 1919:
I am convinced that the immediate task now ahead of us which 
will help conditions over here more than anything else is to get some 
sort of a definition of the terms of the debt of the Allies to the 
United States, and particularly of the British debt. I shall not 
attempt to repeat conversations in detail, but there is undoubtedly in 
5) Ahamed, 505.
6) Silvano A. Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy: Herbert 
Hoover and Benjamin Strong, 1917-1927 (Greenwood Press, 1999), 45.
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existence here a latent underlying feeling that the Allies have made 
the great and most vital sacrifices in the war, both of men and 
finance and in material damage suffered; that our sacrifice have 
been slight and our profits immense, and that the existence of this 
great debt due on demand is a sword of Damocles hanging over their 
hands.
I gather by implication that there is a feeling here that we should 
and have some cancellation of debt all around. It was too indefinite 
for me to suggest any particulars and it is hard to see how such 
cancellation could take place without an actual reduction of 
indebtedness due us, which is not to be contemplated, in my opinion. 
The London schedule of payments, presented by the Reparations 
Committee in 1921, required 132 billion marks in total to be paid by 
Germany. That means, Germany had to pay an impossible 8 billion gold 
marks yearly.7) Germany could only pay a portion of the reparations, 
and angry French (and Belgian) army troops occupied the Ruhr coal 
and steel district in 1923. Production activities halted, and the 
German government’s budget deficit aggravated and finally moderate 
inflation turned into a galloping hyperinflation. “Those with access to 
foreign currency were personally well off: foreigners could enjoy 
bargain vacations. …Major redistribution took place between different 
elements of the middle class without any necessary correlation with 
income levels. …More to the point, the unequal destinies destroyed 
any traditional class interest; inflation wrenched apart the middle-class 
elements of Germany. …Pensioners, retailers, and those who had 
patriotically held government bonds were the silent victims.”8) Although 
7) Charles Meier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, 
and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton University Press, 
1975), 241.
8) Ibid., 360-364.
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the period of hyperinflation weakened labor’s power, because of the 
need to win labor collaboration for full production, the union extracted 
important new bargaining power and corporate status. “The inflation 
and stabilization crisis gravely weakened the democratic forces of this 
equilibrium, thus undermining the social welfare state that the Weimar 
Republic incorporated.”9)
As the crisis of German democracy under the hyperinflation turned 
the whole continent into an unprecedented turmoil, the United States 
had to abandon its apparent isolationist attitudes. “Reawakened U.S. 
participation in European affairs through the Dawes plan and 
subsequent American loans were to transform the internal politics of 
Germany, the relations between France and Germany, and ultimately 
the whole economic position of the continent.”10) Strong did not 
participate in developing the Dawes Plan. The obligation for Germany 
was to pay annually from ￡50 million to ￡125 million and the 
responsibility for converting these marks that Germany paid into 
foreign currencies for use by the creditor countries was left to the 
Agent General and members of the Transfer Committee. Strong mostly 
supported the plan, and he also indicated that the United States 
should create easy money conditions to counteract domestic recession 
on the one hand, and for European countries to utilize loans from the 
United States on the other. Strong suggested that it was necessary 
for any debtor country to be allowed for postponement of payments 
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Having experienced the dreadful German hyperinflation with the 
resulting stabilization of Rentenmark, the U.S. bankers, politicians 
and economists must have learned the importance of currency stabilization 
in order to attain European economic recovery. Among others, Strong 
and Montagu Norman (1871-1950), Governor of the Bank of England, 
would start to prepare for the stabilization efforts in earnest. Strong 
met Norman when he went to London in 1916. Chandler’s account is 
worth citing:
They seem to have liked each other immediately. Thereafter they 
kept up a steady flow of correspondence, including not only official 
letters and cablegrams but also many personal letters on political, 
economic, and financial topics. Strong saw Norman again in 1919 and 
then late in 1920 and early 1921. From that time they were together 
almost every year, sometimes for long periods. They spent long 
vacations together, a few times at Bar Harbor but more often in 
southern France. They traveled together to the important capitals of 
western Europe and often conferred at length with other central 
bankers. Though drawn together by common purposes, their friendship 
was genuine and warm. Their associations were so frequent and 
prolonged and their collaboration so close that it is still impossible to 
determine accurately their relative roles in developing some of the 
ideas and projects that they shared.
Already in 1916 Strong found that he had tuberculosis. After 
struggling for years, the disease would finally take his life. In his 
private life, Strong’s marriage was broken because his wife Katharine 
left him, taking their two daughters with her in 1916. On the other 
hand, Norman was a bachelor throughout his life. He became a board 
member of the Bank of England in 1915. He was elected Deputy 
Governor in 1918 and became Governor in 1920 and held the position 
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for twenty-four years. Norman and Strong both shared a banker’s 
conservatism, distrust of “politicians,” and impatience with “theory” 
that seemed inapplicable to “practice.” Both of them were dedicated to 
their work and their institutions. They were convinced that there was 
no satisfactory substitute for an international gold standard. They 
were also firm believers of the independence of central banks from 
politics and governments. “It is no wonder that they tended to equate 
government intervention with inflationary policies.”12)
The success of the Dawes Plan had been seen as a giant step in 
restoring financial order to continental Europe. The spotlight now 
shifted to Britain and the pound. Comparing with the United States, 
however, the City of London had been forced to impose high interest 
rates regime, with unemployment remaining well above 10 percent. 
And the pound had to be restored to the prewar parity ($4.86) in 
returning to the gold standard. In November 1924, the political landscape 
favorably changed to Norman and his close friend Stanley Baldwin 
resumed the reins of power. Winston Churchill was appointed Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. In December 28, 1924, Norman arrived in New York 
to meet and talk with Strong. Strong’s memorandum of January 11, 
1925 summarized his conversations with Norman:
He [Norman] explained that there had developed a decided 
improvement, especially during the last year or eighteen months…. 
That the existence of lower interest rates in America than in London 
had made it possible to substantially close the London market to 
foreign borrowings….
There were three factors in the situation which might operate at 
12) Chandler, 262.
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times so seriously to their disadvantage…. First, that the volume of 
foreign loans placed in this market last year (1924) was unusual –
much the largest ever known. It was due to relative conditions in 
their country and ours…. Second, that the gradual funding of foreign 
debts owing to our Government, together with other payments such 
as those for war materials sold abroad, relief loans, costs of the 
army of occupations, etc., would likely require in the near future (a 
few years) payments of possibly $250,000,000 a year in addition to 
the annual service of existing foreign government loans of an 
unproductive nature…. Third, that there must be a plain recognition 
of the fact that in a new country such as ours, …there would be 
times when speculative tendencies would make it necessary for the 
Federal Reserve Banks to exercise restraint by increased discount 
rates, and possibly rather high money rates in the market.
But Mr. Norman’s feelings, which, in fact, are shared by me, 
indicated that the alternative－failure of resumption of gold payment
－being a confession by the British Government that it was 
impossible to resume, would be followed by a long period of 
unsettled conditions too serious really to contemplate. It would mean 
violent fluctuations in the exchanges, with probably progressive 
deteriorations of the values of foreign currencies vis-a-vis the 
dollar; …13)
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York would send the gold credit 
of $200 million to the Bank of England for two years after resumption, 
and another credit of $300 million would be necessary for the British 
Government to be arranged through their bankers in the United 
States. Strong explained it this way in his testimony before the House 
Committee on banking and Currency, April, 1926. “There was a credit 
extended by a group of banks－I do not know how many－quite a 
large group－directly to the British government, through its financial 
13) Chandler, 309-311.
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agents in New York, J.P. Morgan & Co.”14) He talked about the 
importance of Britain’s stabilization. “The determination to resume a free 
gold market in London means ultimate world-wide reestablishment of 
the gold standard.”15) He also explained about the influences of these 
transactions for American foreign trade. “The interest of the United 
States in the restoration of sound monetary conditions and stable 
exchanges lies largely in the fact that we have the largest foreign 
trade of any country, and just now especially in the fact that the one 
industry in this country which has suffered a depression from which 
it has not yet fully recovered, is the farming industry and that it so 
largely depends upon foreign markets. Roughly one-half of all that 
we export is produced by farmers and one-half of all that we export 
is cotton and any considerable part of this crop that is left over and 
cannot be sold makes the price of the whole crop, as you know.”16)
The British Government announced its decision to restore gold 
payments on April 28, 1925. As it turned out, the restoration of sterling 
with its old parity of $4.86 was seriously overvalued by more than 10 
percent. The Bank of England had to keep interest rates high. It was 
necessary for British industries to cut wages and prices across the 
economy and endure high rates of unemployment during the latter 
half of the 1920s. The rise of the exchange rate more than harmed 
the export such as coal, steel, and shipbuilding. In May 1926, general 
strike broke out in coal industry.
14) W. Randolph Burgess, ed., Interpretations of Federal Reserve Policy in the 
Speeches and Writings of Benjamin Strong (Garland Pub., Inc. New York, 
1983, originally published by Harper in 1930), 291.
15) Ibid., 282.
16) Ibid., 288.
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For Strong and Norman this was only the beginning of their international 
cooperation in resuming the gold standard. During the next three 
years he devoted his energy to stabilize currencies in Belgium, Italy, 
Poland, Rumania, and France. In Belgium, a new unit for foreign 
exchange purposes, belga (equal to five Belgian francs), was created. 
The new Governor of the Bank of France, Emile Moreau was from the 
beginning suspicious and distrustful of Norman.17) Relations between 
Norman and Moreau never became cordial and trustful. In France, no 
large foreign credit to either the Bank of France or the French Government 
would be required. In August 1926, the Bank of France was authorized 
to buy and sell foreign exchange and to purchase gold and silver at 
market prices above the old legal level. This was called “de facto” 
stabilization of franc. In June 1928, the franc was stabilized at 3.92 
cents (“de jure” stabilization). This rate turned out to be considerably 
undervalued.
Hyalmar Schacht (1877-1970) was among the group of bankers who 
cooperated in stabilizing international finance during the 1920s. In 
November 1923, Schacht became currency commissioner for the Weimar 
Republic and participated in the introduction of the Rentenmark, a 
new currency the value of which was based on a mortgage on all of 
the properties in Germany. Norman met him in December 1924 in 
London and they began their “genuine and enduring friendship.”18) 
Norman wrote to Strong: “The new President of the Reichsbank has 
been here for several days. He seems to know the situation from A to 
Z and to have, temporarily, more control of it than I should have 
17) Chandler, 365.
18) Ahamed, 196.
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believed possible: He is acting more resolutely than his predecessor, 
Havenstein.”19) Schacht had been serving as President of the Reichsbank 
in 1923-30.
In Germany, the stock market boom was closely linked to a movement 
by industry to free itself from dependence on bank loans and secure 
investment funds by selling new stock issues. As the economy grew, 
demand for capital increased, and rising interest rates were one reflection 
of this boom. This movement was made more severe by a decline in 
the German savings rate after January 1927. As market interest rates 
rose, demand for Reichsbank discounts still being offered at 5 percent 
also increased, and the bank soon found its rate the lowest in Germany. 
“Despite all Schacht’ warnings, the temptation to incur short-term 
American loans for various public and private German indulgences 
continued unchecked, and part of the borrowed foreign money went 
straight into the stock exchange for speculation. Schacht feared that 
he might soon lose control of the mark… Germany was paying reparations 
with borrowed money while speculators were investing borrowed funds 
in massive purchases of stocks on margin.”20)
Schacht began to worry about the Reichsbank’s reserve holdings, 
and he was determined to stop further short-term borrowing by 
German banks. In 1927, however, he could not tighten credit because 
by doing so he would end up encouraging borrowers to look abroad 
for cheaper loans. On May 11, 1927 Schacht informed the major 
German banks that the Reichsbank would not tolerate further 
speculation on the stock market. Banks which were lending too 
19) Ahamed, 197.
20) John Weitz, Hitler’s Banker: Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht (Timewarner, 
2001), 91.
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heavily to stock market speculators would be denied discounting 
privileges at the Reichsbank.21) This policy led immediately to a 
German stock market crash in May 1927. After this experience, Schacht 
focused on government spending as the primary source of his frustration 
and failure. He would pursue the revision of the Dawes Plan in 
earnest. After the meeting of Strong, Norman, Schacht and Charles 
Rist (Moreau’s place) in New York in the summer of 1927, the Open 
Market Investment Committee bought about $ 200 million government 
securities and all the Reserve Banks lowered their discount rates from 
4 to 3.5 percent in the period from July 29 to mid-September. This 
easy-money policy had a double objective－to combat business 
recession at home ad to relieve monetary strains abroad.22)
By early 1928, the concern about speculative activity had led to 
rate increases. The volume of brokers’ loans considerably expanded. 
Every type of person was opening a brokerage account.23) In April 
stock prices and brokers’ loan reached higher levels than ever before. 
The Federal Reserve raised interest rates from 3.5 percent to 4 
percent in February, and to 4.5 percent in May, and to 5 percent in 
July 1928. These successive rates increases could not stop the fund 
flow to the stock market. They exerted adverse effects to the European 
financial market, because the difference of interest rates narrowed 
between the United States, Britain and Germany. The short term 
loans almost stopped to flowing into Germany, with the recession in 
Germany worsening than ever. 
21) William C. McNeil, American Money and the Weimar Republic: Economics 
and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression (Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1986), 149.
22) Chandler, 377.
23) Ahamed, 310.
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Strong considered this question from two different perspectives. 
To attempt some such policy, which is what the Federal Reserve 
System is sometimes urged to do, solely for the purpose of 
influencing the price of stocks, might duplicate the Italian 
development. The amount of credit employed in carrying stocks can 
only be reduced as a consequence of a reduction in the price of 
stocks. An attempt to reduce the price of stocks cannot be effected 
without an increase in the cost of credit employed in carrying 
stocks. I think the conclusion is inescapable that any policy directed 
solely to forcing liquidation in the stock loan account and 
concurrently in the prices of securities will be found to have a 
widespread and somewhat similar effect in other directions, mostly to 
the detriment of the healthy prosperity of this country. 
Some of our critics damn us vigorously and constantly for not 
tackling the stock speculations. I am wondering what will be the 
consequences of such a policy if it is undertaken and who will 
assume the responsibility for it.24)
Strong’s health, however, deteriorated badly since the summer of 
1928 and could not participate in the debate of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York anymore. Norman’s last letter to Strong showed his 
deep sadness on the human destiny.
Dear old friend,
How hard and how cruel life is. These past weeks I have often 
thought and dreamed and spoken of you: I came home expecting 
most surely to find you on top of the wave. But I sit down in some 
bitterness to write you such a letter as this….
But what a stage ours has been over these ten or twelve years! 
Unique－imaginative－far－sighted. Your early dreams set a goal 
before a world which was then so distracted as to be blind and 
24) Chandler, 427.
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incredulous. Now that goal has been pretty well reached little by 
little and your dreams have come true and over these years I have 
watched the process (as no one else has done) with affection and 
pride. For the rest of my life that belongs to me as a memory which 
none can take away.
And remember－when the time comes－let me be near to hold your 
hand and to watch the coming as well as going.
God bless you and my love now and ever.25)
The international financial cooperation led by Strong had been 
disintegrating towards the end of 1920s, because the alienation of 
economic interests between the U.S. and European countries inevitably 
widened during this period. To that must be added that the opposition 
to Strong’s internationalism intensified inside the administration as 
time went on. Herbert Hoover described that Strong had become “a 
mental annex to Europe.”26) I would rather agree with Priscilla 
Roberts’ view: 
There is no reason to doubt that Strong believed his work for 
European currency stabilization also promoted the best interests of 
the United States. He argued frequently that uncertain exchange 
rates, especially when the dollar was at a premium against other 
currencies, made it difficult for American exporters to price their 
goods competitively.27)
We have been tracing the cooperation among financial elites of the 
25) Norman to Strong, September 6, 1928, cited in Chandler, 472-473.
26) Ahamed, 276.
27) Priscilla Roberts, “Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve, and the Limits 
to Interwar American Nationalism, Part II: Strong and the Federal Reserve 
System in the 1920s,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly 
Vol. 86/2 (Spring, 2000), 87.
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United States, Great Britain, France and Germany in the 1920s, although 
we could not go into details of French banker Emil Moreau. The core 
relations of these four people were Strong and Norman. Norman seems 
to represent the decaying Empire of Great Britain, and Strong, growing 
young United States, leaving his illness aside. Strong seems to have 
acted as a representative of a creditor nation with its richness and 
generosity. Although Norman took highly of Schacht’s ability to carry 
out his task, Moreau and Schacht never reconciled with each other. 
This reflected the French elites’ deep suspicion against Germany 
concerning fulfillment of reparation payments. When Strong helped 
Norman in restoring Britain’s gold standard in 1925, some United 
States government officials criticized Strong’s act as sacrificing his 
own country’s interest.
Generally speaking, one of the necessary requirements of genuine 
elites must be his (or her) broad-mindedness. The important qualification 
is their sense of calling, or noblesse oblige. He or she should have an 
enlightened self-interest, or a kind of altruism which may overcome 
narrow nationalism. Norman also had an international perspective; 
however, Schacht and Moreau were confined to their own country’s 
severe economic conditions and could not afford to have genuine 
internationalism.
The relation between Norman and Strong reminds me of another 
interchange of two major figures of economic history in the last half 
of the 1930s and 1940s: John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) of Great 
Britain and Harry Dexter White (1892-1948) of the United States. 
Keynes and White together laid the basis for the postwar monetary 
system called the Bretton Woods system through numerous heated 
debates. Although their standpoint heavily reflected their own countries’ 
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interest, both the Keynes Plan and the White Plan were built upon 
their own ideas of the new monetary system. Both of them learned a 
lot from the financial experiences of the interwar period. In the end, 
the supremacy of the White Plan over Keynes in designing the IMF 
and IBRD was determined by, it is said, not because the former had 
the theoretical prevalence, but because the United States’ hegemony 
had been well established at that time and Britain had to yield to the 
United States. Two years after Keynes died, White was accused of 
being a member of the communist espionage ring. He died shortly 
after he testified and denied being a communist before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities. White lived a tragic life, so 
did Strong, though in different circumstances.
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Abstract
Benjamin Strong and International Financial 
Cooperation during the 1920s
Eiichi Akimoto
(Teikyo Heisei University)
Benjamin Strong (1872-1928) was an “elite” banker, who first engaged 
in founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Later he served as 
governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1914-1928). Already in 
1916 Strong found that he had tuberculosis. After struggling for years, the 
disease would finally take his life. In their A Monetary History of the 
United States, Friedman and Schwartz wrote: If Strong had still alive and 
head of the New York Bank in the fall of 1930, he would very likely have 
recognized the oncoming liquidity crisis for what it was, would have been 
prepared by experience and conviction to take strenuous and appropriate 
measures to head it off, and would have had the standing to carry the 
System with him. 
When Strong was governor of the FRB of New York, the system itself 
was in its infancy, and the New York bank was more powerful than the 
Federal Reserve Board itself. Strong played a similar role of Ben 
Bernanke, the current Chairman of the Board of Governors of the United 
States Federal Reserve, although organizationally the New York Bank was 
just only one of twelve regional banks under the FRB. Strong’s most 
important task was to recover and stabilize world economy through the 
restoration of world gold standard and he needed cooperation of Montague 
Norman of the Bank of England among others, and also of Emile Moreau 
of the Bank of France, and Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank of Germany in 
these efforts. He succeeded in rebuilding the gold standard beginning with 
Britain. The reconstructed monetary system was different from the prewar 
system governed by Britain, mainly because of the heavy concentration of 
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gold to the U.S. and France. Strong took great pains to control the rates 
of interest to avoid deflation on the one hand, and to “sterilize” gold 
coming into the U.S. to keep off inflation on the other. The international 
financial cooperation led by Strong had been disintegrating towards the end 
of 1920s, because the alienation of economic interests between the U.S. 
and European countries inevitably widened during this period.
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